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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
The National Association of Social Workers 
("NASW") and its Ohio Chapter respectfully submit 
this brief as amici curiae in support of Petitioners. 1 
NASW is the largest professional organization of 
social workers in the United States. It represents 
over 130,000 social workers with chapters in each of 
the fifty States, as well as in the District of 
Columbia, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and Puerto 
Rico. The Ohio Chapter of NASW has over 4,300 
members. Since its inception in 1955, NASW has 
worked to develop and maintain high standards of 
professional practice in the field of social work, to 
advance sound social policies, and to strengthen and 
unify the social work profession. Its activities in 
furtherance of these goals include promulgating 
professional standards (including Standards for 
Social Work Practice in Child Welfare), enforcing the 
NASW Code of Ethics, conducting research, 
publishing materials relevant to the profession, and 
providing continuing education. 
1 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amici curiae 
state that no counsel for any party authored this 
brief in whole or in part, and that no entity or 
person, other than amici, its members, or its counsel 
made any monetary contribution towards the 
preparation and submission of this brief. Counsel of 
record for all parties have consented to the filing of 
this brief in a letter filed with the Clerk's office. 
2 
NASW and its Ohio Chapter have a significant 
and direct interest in this case. If the Sixth Circuit's 
decision is allowed to stand, NASW members will be 
exposed to personal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
That, in turn, may ultimately lead to reduced 
protection of the profession's most valuable and 
vulnerable clients - abused children. 
The Sixth Circuit's decision - denying qualified 
immunity to social workers who removed child-abuse 
victims without a warrant - may also alter the entire 
manner in which social workers evaluate child abuse 
matters. Child abuse is one of the most sensitive -
and emblematic - areas treated by social workers. 
Indeed, the social work profession ''has always 
advocated on behalf of those affected by poverty, 
neglect, and disadvantage. From this perspective, 
social work's efforts on behalf of at-risk children and 
their families are perhaps the profession's most 
perfect fit." Tracy Whitaker, Toby Weismiller & 
Elizabeth J. Clark, Assuring the Sufficiency of a 
Frontline Workforce: A National Study of Licensed 
Social Workers, NASW, 8 (Mar. 2006), available at 
http://workforce.socialworkers.org I studies I children/ 
childrenJamilies.pdf. But while "social workers have 
been steadfast in their professional and personal 
commitments to protect children... by developing 
programs and social supports that help prevent child 
abuse," id, at 8-9, the Sixth Circuit ruled that social 
workers should be held personally liable for a 
reasonable removal of these same abused children. 
The Sixth Circuit's decision came despite the fact 
that the "social workers faced an uncertain legal and 
factual landscape," Kovacic v. Cuyahoga County 
3 
Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 724 F.3d 687, 710 
(6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., dissenting); despite the 
fact that "a state court judge found three days later 
that they acted properly," id.; despite the 
"undisputed [fact] that [the social workers] held the 
subjective belief that their actions were authorized 
by the juvenile court's standing order and the 
circumstances," Kovacic, 809 F. Supp. 2d 754, 794 
(N.D. Ohio, 2011) (District Court findings); and 
despite the fact that the social workers based their 
decision on legal advice provided by "an assistant 
prosecuting attorney." Kovacic, 724 F.3d at 692. Yet, 
despite all of these facts, the Sixth Circuit held that 
the social workers could be personally liable for their 
decision to remove the abused children. 
Conversely, this Court has held - under 
considerably less favorable facts for both social 
worker and child - that no personal liability should 
attach where a social worker made a decision not to 
remove a child. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't 
of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (child not 
removed suffers permanent brain damage). NASW 
now invites this Court to hold the same for child 
removal cases. 
In other words, NASW asks this Court to stand in 
the shoes of social - and other child protective 
services - workers, who are charged with the daily 
protection of abused children, and apply qualified 
immunity to those workers in all reasonable removal 
cases. 
4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
"Child abuse and neglect is one of the Nation's 
most serious concerns." U.S. Dep't of Health & 
Human Servs., Admin. For Children & Families, 
Child Maltreatment 2012, 1 (2012), available at 
http: I lwww.acf.hhs.gov/ sites/ default/files I cb/ cm2 
012.pdf. There are many forms of child abuse -
physical, psychological, sexual, and plain neglect. Id. 
at 21 (Exh. 3-E). At the end of the child-abuse harm 
spectrum lies death. And the numbers are 
staggering: From 2001 to 2010, more than 15,500 
child-abuse deaths have been recorded in the U.S. -
nearly threefold the amount of military deaths in 
both Iraq and Afghanistan during that same period 
(5,877). See Every Child Matters Educational Fund, 
Child Abuse & Neglect Deaths in America 1 (Table 1) 
(2012), available at http://www.everychildmatters.org 
/storage/documents/pdf/reports/can_report_august20 
12_final.pdf. In 2011 and 2012, 1,580 and 1,640 more 
children died, respectively, as result of abuse. Child 
Maltreatment, supra, at 52 (Exh. 4-A). 
Congress, in an attempt to respond to the wide-
spread problem of child abuse, passed the Child 
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA). 
CAPTA was first signed into law on January 31, 
1974, and reauthorized in 1978, 1984, 1988, 1992, 
1996, 2003, and 2010 (42 U.S.C § 5101 et seq.; 42 
U.S.C. § 5116 et seq.). At the heart of CAPTA lies a 
federal grant program, allowing the States to develop 
better training programs and innovative responses 
"to reports of child abuse and neglect." (See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 5106(a)(l-2)). 
5 
The fight against child abuse is also a legislative 
priority at the state level. All fifty states and the 
District of Columbia have child-abuse prevention 
laws; and each has provisions allowing social 
workers, under certain circumstances, to remove 
abused children from their home.2 
2 See ALA. CODE § 26-14-6 (1975); ALASKA STAT. 
§ 47.10.142 (2003); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-821 
(2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-1001 (2011); CAL. 
WEL. & INST. § 305 (1988); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 19-3-308 (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § l 7a-101 
(2013); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 16 § 907 (1999); D.C. 
CODE § 4-1303.04 (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.401 
(2013); HAW. REV. STAT. § 587A-ll (2013); IDAHO 
CODE§ 16-1608 (2005); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 515 
(1998); IND. CODE § 31-34-2-1 (1997); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 232.79 (2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2231 
(2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.060 (1998); LA. 
CHILD. CODE ANN. ART. 620 (2006); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. TIT. 22 § 4023 (2004); MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW 
§ 5-709 (2012); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 119 § 24 
(2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.630 (1999); MINN. 
STAT.§ 260C.148 (2005);Mrss. CODE ANN.§ 43-21-303 
(1980); Mo. STAT. ANN.§ 210.125 (1982); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 41-3-301 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-
248 (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432B.390 (2011); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:6-a (2002); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 9:6-8.27 (2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-6 
(2005); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW. § 417 (2009); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 7B-500 (2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-06 
(2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.31 (2002); OKLA. 
STAT. TIT. lOA § 1-4-201 (2009); OR. REV. STAT. 
6 
Social workers, as part of the child protective 
services (CPS) workforce, stand at the forefront in 
the fight against child abuse. In 2012 alone - the last 
year for which data is available - child protective 
services responded to well over three million reports 
of child abuse. Child Maltreatment, supra, at 18 
(Exh. 3-A) (3,184,000 unique reports responded to in 
2012). The removal of a child from his or her home -
never an easy decision - is a measure taken by social 
workers only after the child is found to be in some 
form of imminent danger - either of physical harm 
(as in the instant case, or in the case of Joshua 
DeShaney), of death (as nearly three children die 
every day in America from child abuse), or other type 
of harm. Only under those circumstances would a 
social worker decide to remove a child from the 
home, attempting to prevent irreparable 
consequences. 
And that is precisely what happened in this case. 
In a meeting preceding the decision to remove the 
children, family members and police officers reported 
to the social workers that the children "were in 
§ 419B.150 (2001); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6369 (1995); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 40-ll-5(d) (1996); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 63-7-660 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-7A-12 
(1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-l-114(a)(2) (1999); 
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.104 (2005); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78A-6-106 (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 33 
§ 5301 (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1517 (2003); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.050 (1999); W.VA. 
CODE§ 49-6-3 (2012); WIS. STAT.§ 4S.19 (1997); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 14-3-405 (2005). 
7 
'imminent risk' of physical harm" from their mother. 
Kovacic, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 764 (District Court 
findings). Based on that information, the social 
workers concluded that "the Kovacic children were at 
a more elevated risk than they first thought, and 
determined it was immediately necessary to remove 
Daniel and Katherine from [their mother]'s home in 
light of [the social workers'] belief that the children 
were in imminent danger of physical harm." Id. The 
social workers then sought legal advice, and received 
"the signature of the assigned assistant prosecuting 
attorney." Id. Only then did they proceed to remove 
the children. And three days later a juvenile court 
magistrate approved. Yet, three years later, in a 
federal court, the social workers were denied the 
benefit of the qualified immunity defense. 
NASW's first argument is simple. To protect 
children from abuse - a major congressional and 
state legislative goal - this Court should apply 
qualified immunity to protect social workers from 
personal liability where a reasonable decision has 
been made to remove a child without a warrant. 
NASW's second argument is equally cogent. 
DeShaney was decided 25 years ago. Since then, this 
Court's "continued silence" on the issue, Kovacic, 724 
F.3d at 708 (Sutton, J., dissenting), has failed "to 
provide guidance to those charged with the difficult 
task of protecting child welfare within the confines of 
the Fourth Amendment." Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. 
Ct. 2020, 2032 (2011). In light of the circuit split on 
this issue - compare Hatch v. Dep't for Children, 274 
F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2001) with Kovacic, 724 F.3d (6th 
8 
Cir. 2013) - guidance from this Court is more 
necessary today than ever. 
ARGUMENT 
I. To PROTECT CHILDREN FROM ABUSE - A 
MAJOR CONGRESSIONAL AND STATE 
LEGISLATIVE GOAL - THIS COURT SHOULD 
GRANT QUALIFIED IMMUNITY TO SOCIAL 
WORKERS MAKING A REASONABLE 
DECISION TO REMOVE A CHILD WITHOUT 
A WARRANT. 
A. Congress And The States Place 
Child-Abuse Protection, Including 
Removal, As A Top Legislative 
Priority. 
Child-abuse prevention and treatment are major 
Congressional priorities. By title alone, the Child 
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act - which has 
been reauthorized seven times since first being 
signed into law in 1974 - epitomizes that approach. 
Congress still considers the issue of "abuse, neglect, 
and [child] fatalities" to be "of significant social 
concerns in our Nation." Opening Statement of 
Ranking Member Platts, U.S. House Comm. On 
Educ. & Labor's Subcomm. On Healthy Families & 
Cmtys., Preventing Child Abuse and Improving 
Responses to Families in Crisis, 1 (Nov. 5, 2009), 
available at archives.republicans.edlabor.house.gov 
I hearingsMarkup _details. aspx? NewsID= 133 7. 
9 
While CAPTA does not deal directly with the 
issue of child removal, the States - which are the 
grantees under CAPTA - have all enacted provisions 
allowing the removal of child abuse victims from 
their homes. 3 
Ohio, for example, had two statutory provisions in 
2002, which are still valid today, authorizing social -
and other child protective services - workers to 
remove children from their homes in cases of 
suspected abuse. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN 
§§ 2151.3l(A)(3)(a), (A)(6)(a); Kovacic, 724 F.3d at 
700 n.7. In this case, the social workers relied on 
section 2151.3l(A)(3)(a), which authorizes child 
removal by social workers when "[t]here are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the child is 
suffering from illness or injury and is not receiving 
proper care, ... and the child removal is necessary to 
prevent immediate or threatened physical or 
emotional harm." (Emphasis added). 
In the case at bar, not only were the social 
workers of the (reasonable) opinion that all these 
conditions had been met, but so too was the 
prosecuting attorney who signed the Temporary Care 
Order allowing the removal, id. at 692, and the 
family-court judge who reviewed the matter three 
days later. Id. The Ohio statutory wording is not 
unusual. Many state legislators use similarly-worded 
provisions, requiring some degree of "imminent 
danger," to authorize the removal of children without 
a prior hearing.4 
3 See supra, Note 2. 
4 See supra, Note 2. 
'. 
10 
B. Protecting Children From Abuse, 
Including Removal, Is Often 
Performed By Social Workers As 
Part Of A Child Protective Services 
Team. 
To protect children from abuse - to effectuate the 
legislative goals articulated by Congress and the 
States - the law requires agents. In many cases, 
those State agents are social workers. As a recent 
NASW standards' publication suggests: "Child 
welfare systems across the country serve some of the 
most vulnerable children, youths, and families. 
These systems are designed to support families and 
to protect children from harm through an array of 
prevention and intervention services; in particular, 
they are designed to support children who have been 
or are at risk of abuse or neglect. Historically, social 
workers have played critical roles in these systems. 
Studies indicate that social work degrees are the 
most appropriate degrees for this field of practice and 
have been directly linked to better outcomes for 
children and families and retention of staff." Kim 
Day, Carol Harper & Carmen D. Weisner, NASW 
Standards For Social Work Practice In Child 
Welfare, 5-6 (2013) (citations omitted), available at 
http://www.socialworkers.org/practice/standards/chil 
dwelfarestandards2012.pdf. 
Indeed, social workers were accurately described 
as the "frontline workforce" in the 'fight to protect 
children from abuse. See Assuring the Sufficiency of a 
11 
Frontline Workforce, supra, at 10 ("The study 
confirms that licensed social workers are highly 
involved in providing direct services to children and 
their families in a variety of community settings. In 
fact, 78 percent of all licensed social workers provide 
services to clients age 21 or younger, regardless of 
the[ir] practice setting of focus."). And being on the 
frontlines calls, almost inevitably, for the need to 
make extremely difficult decisions under extremely 
difficult conditions. 
Thus, for example, in the county from which this 
case has emerged, "every day the frontline social 
workers for the Cuyahoga County's Department of 
Children and Family Services fight to save kids. 
Their job calls for making difficult decisions, and a 
lot of them. The 450 case workers deal with nearly 
8,000 families a year, including 1,800 children in 
foster care or other forms of custody." Laura 
Johnston, Cuyahoga County Children and Family 
Services Workers Strive to Save Kids, THE PLAIN 
DEALER, Nov. 24, 2012, available at 
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2012/11/cu 
yahoga_county_childrens_serv.html. And the type of 
work performed by those social workers often takes a 
considerable emotional toll. As recently noted with 
regards to the Cuyahoga County social workers: 
"Social workers rarely leave their jobs at the office. 
Some try, but more often than not, they fail. The 
round-the-clock demands and emotional toll of 
dealing with abused or neglected children inevitably 
bleed into evenings, weekends and vacations. And 
just as inevitably, the workers' spouses and children 
share in the pain and disappointments." Laura 
12 
Johnston, Children's Services Job Tahes Toll on 
Workers, Families, THE PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 26, 2012, 
available at http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index. 
ssf/2012/11/childrens_services_job_takes_t.html. 
Finally, child removal - the act of taking a child 
"from his or her normal place of residence to a foster 
care setting," Child Maltreatment, supra at 119 - is 
perhaps the hardest task performed by social 
workers. Indeed, "the cases that really get to the 
[Cuyahoga County social workers], the ones that 
they can't leave at the office, are the unusual ones: 
emaciated toddlers, 8-year-olds pocked with cigarette 
burns, teenagers abandoned because their parents 
don't want them anymore. The worst cases, they 
agree, require them to take a child away from a 
parent, sometimes even wrench an infant from the 
arms of a sobbing mother. Those cases can haunt for 
life." Social Workers Strive to Save Kids, Id. at 3. 
C. Therefore, To Protect Children 
From Abuse, This Court Should 
Protect Social Workers By Granting 
Qualified Immunity When A 
Reasonable Decision To Remove A 
Child Has Been Made. 
Since protection from child abuse is a major 
federal and state legislative priority, and since the 
persons entrusted with such a task includes social 
workers, the logical conclusion is that (legislative) 
protection of children from abuse requires (judicial) 
protection of social workers from personal liability 
when they act reasonably. While NASW does not 
13 
contend that every decision to remove a child without 
a warrant should be exempted from liability, it does 
contend that reasonable decisions to remove should 
be granted qualified immunity. See, e.g., Stanton v. 
Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 5 (2013) ("Qualified immunity 
gives government officials breathing room to make 
reasonable but mistaken judgments, and protects all 
but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 
violate the law.") (citation omitted). 
What constitutes a "reasonable" decision to 
remove? As in this case, three elements may satisfy a 
prima facie case of reasonableness. First, the social 
workers engaged in a pre-removal consultation with 
family members, other social workers, and, as 
appropriate here, the police, to assess the current 
level of risk to the child. See Kovacic, 724 F.3d at 702 
("Say you are a social worker ... On March 26, 2002 
you and five other social workers and officers along 
with several members of the Kovacic family meet to 
discuss the situation, and, with your operational silos 
removed, discuss the risk that the mother might 
imminently harm the two children." (Sutton, J., 
dissenting)). Second, the social workers obtained a 
pre-removal consultation with, and approval of, a 
state attorney, presumably finding the removal to 
comply with state-law requirements. See Kovacic, 
809 F. Supp. 2d at 764 (removal order issued only 
after social workers received "the signature of the 
assigned assistant prosecuting attorney."). Third, the 
social workers took part in a post-removal judicial 
hearing that took place as soon as possible after the 
removal. (While judicial confirmation of the 
removal's necessity is not required for determination 
I j 
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of reasonableness, 5 such finding may increase its 
likelihood. See Kovacic, 724 F.3d at 703 ("Within 
three days, and again consistent with state law, a 
state court judge holds a hearing. She finds that the 
requisite endangerment and emergency existed, 
requiring the children to remain in state custody." 
(Sutton, J., dissenting))). 
Establishing these three elements - the pre-
removal peer consultation, the legal approval, and 
the post-removal judicial hearing - provides a prima 
facie case of reasonableness warranting the grant of 
qualified immunity. The inquiry into the 
reasonableness of the decision alone - rather the 
constitutionality of the actions taken by the social 
workers - may also alleviate some of the concerns 
voiced by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas in 
their dissenting opinions in Camreta, regarding the 
unnecessary inquiry into complex constitutional 
issues. See 131 S.Ct. at 2036 (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
see also id. at 2037 (Kennedy, J., joined by Thomas, 
J., dissenting).6 
5 See, e.g., Hatch v. Dep't for Children, 274 F.3d 12 
(1st Cir. 2001) (qualified immunity granted despite 
judicial finding to the contrary). 
6 Such a simple inquiry may also prevent fractured 
opinions by the federal Court of Appeals, such as 
when five judges of the same court were in favor of 
granting qualified immunity in case of child removal 
- even willing to "shake [the social worker's] hand" 
for the work he has done to prevent child abuse -
while others vote to deny an en bane h'earing entirely 
following a finding of no qualified immunity. 
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II. THIS COURT'S "CONTINUED SILENCE" ON 
THE ISSUE SINCE DESHANEY (1989), AND 
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT THAT EMERGED, 
MERIT TIMELY GUIDANCE FOR THOSE 
CHARGED WITH PROTECTING CHILDREN 
FROM ABUSE. 
A. DeShaney (1989) Left The Issue Of 
Personal Liability In Cases Of Child 
Removal Unresolved. 
In DeShaney, this Court dealt with the matter of 
4-year-old Joshua DeShaney, who was beaten so 
severely by his father that "he fell into a life-
threatening coma. Emergency brain surgery revealed 
a series of hemorrhages caused by traumatic injuries 
to the head inflicted over a long period of time. 
Joshua did not die, but he suffered brain damage so 
severe that he [was] expected to spend the rest of his 
life confined to an institution for the profoundly 
retarded." 489 U.S. at 194. 
In DeShaney, the question before the Court was 
whether, under those circumstances, the social 
worker should be held personally liable under § 1983 
for her decision not to remove the child - her "failure 
to intervene to protect him." Id. at 193. The Court 
held that no personal liability would attach "for 
Southerland v. City of New York, 681 F.3d 122, 138-
39 (2d Cir. 2012) (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting from denial 
of rehearing en bane). 
16 
failure to act in situations such as the present one." 
Id. at 203. The opinion was not unanimous, however, 
containing a moving dissent. 7 It is still applicable 
law, however, and has been for the past 25 years. 
Importantly, the Court acknowledged - but left 
open - the question of the correct law to apply in 
opposite cases, where social workers intervened and 
removed a child before a tragedy occurred: "In 
defense of [the social workers] is must also be said 
that had they moved too soon to take custody of the 
son away from the father, they would likely have 
been met with charges of improperly intruding into 
the parent-child relationship, charges based on the 
same Due Process Clause that forms the basis for the 
present charge of failure to provide adequate 
7 See Justice Brennan, with whom Justices Marshall 
and Blackmun joined, dissenting: "Poor Joshua! 
Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible, 
bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father, and 
abandoned by respondents [social workers] who 
placed him in a dangerous predicament and who 
knew or learned what was going on, and yet did 
essentially nothing except, as the Court revealingly 
observes, 'dutifully recorded these incidents in [their] 
files.' It is a sad commentary upon American life, and 
constitutional principles ... that this child, Joshua 
DeShaney, now is assigned to live out the remainder 
of his life profoundly retarded." id. at 213 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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protection." Id. at 203. This, in essence, is the 
question before the Court today.s 
B. Since DeShaney, A Circuit Split Has 
Emerged With Regards To Social 
Workers' Personal Liability In 
Cases OfWarrantless Removal. 
DeShaney was decided 25 years ago. Since then, 
this Court's "continued silence" on the issue, Kovacic, 
724 F.3d at 708 (Sutton, J., dissenting), has failed "to 
provide guidance to those charged with the difficult 
task of protecting child welfare within the confines of 
the Fourth Amendment." Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 
2032. Beyond the lack of guidance, however, lies a 
deeper issue. DeShaney left many a social worker 
wondering - just before the proverbial "knock on the 
door," just prior to committing to the life-altering 
decision of removing a child - whether they should 
take any action at all. Should they refrain from 
acting, no personal liability would attach. As one 
commentator observed, "[following DeShaney,] the 
social worker is expected not only to make an 
incredibly difficult and consequential decision with 
imperfect information, but to do so in a legal 
s Amici are aware of the fact that the decision below 
rests both on Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment 
grounds. For purpose of the present context, however 
- the acknowledgement that social workers may be 
personally exposed for acting either too early or too 
late - Amici respectfully submit that this Court's 
remarks apply equally on both grounds. 
I ., ,, 
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framework that provides dramatic incentives for 
inaction .... DeShaney tells the social worker that it is 
safer from a standpoint of personal liability to leave 
an endangered child in the home than to attempt to 
remove him." Rebecca Aviel, Restoring Equipoise to 
Child Welfare, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 401, 404, 413 (2010) . 
NASW agrees with that commentator, who also 
recommends that "a system that has been 
characterized as approaching at, or past the breaking 
point should not be further stressed with a legal 
framework that skews the incentives for its decision 
makers by punishing only erroneous decisions to 
act." Id. at 404. But such "punishment" is precisely 
what the Sixth Circuit has inflicted with its decision 
below. It leaves social - and other child protective 
service - workers with a substantial disincentive for 
carrying out CAPTA's mission, to protect children 
from harm. NASW now urges this Court to reverse 
this undesirable result. 
Since DeShaney, the Circuit Courts have been 
split with regards to whether qualified immunity 
should be granted to social workers in cases of 
warrantless removal. Obviously, the Sixth Circuit's 
decision below held that no qualified immunity 
should be accorded in such a case, based on both 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. 
Kovacic, 724 F.3d at 702. Similarly, the Second 
Circuit held in 2011 that qualified immunity should 
be denied to a social worker under somewhat similar 
circumstances, on both Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment grounds. Southerland v. City of New 
Yorh, 680 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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Conversely, the First Circuit held in a case that 
"would have covered the social workers here," 
Kovacic, 724 F.3d at 706 (Sutton, J., dissenting), that 
a social worker should be granted qualified immunity 
in a warrantless removal case - even where the 
family court, which initially issued an ex-parte order 
of temporary custody, ultimately found "that there 
was no probable cause to believe that [the child] had 
been abused." Hatch v. Dep't for Children, 274 F.3d 
12, 18 (1st Cir. 2001). Although Hatch was decided 
on Fourteenth Amendment grounds alone, its 
holding is still instructive: "We need to go no further. 
The record shows that [the social worker] had a 
reasonable basis both for suspecting child abuse and 
for believing [the child] to be in danger (and, 
therefore, that he acted justifiably in taking the boy 
into temporary custody). The fact that this suspicion 
proved, in the long run, to be unfounded does not 
strip [the social worker] of his entitlement to 
qualified immunity in regard to a claim of damages. 
See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) 
(emphasizing that the qualified immunity standard 
protects many mistaken judgments.)" Hatch, 27 4 
F.3d at 25.9 
9 Hatch is still good law. See Hootstein v. Collins, 928 
F. Supp. 2d 326, 333 (D. Mass. 2013) (citing Hatch 
for the proposition that "the state may separate the 
child from the parent, before any hearing in which it 
would be required to show cause for such a 
separation."). 
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Similarly, the Tenth Circuit, relying on Hatch, 
held in a warrantless removal case that qualified 
immunity should be granted. Gomes v. Wood, 451 
F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 2006). Here, too, the court's 
summary is instructive: "When confronted with 
evidence of child abuse, [social workers] may be 
required to make 'on-the-spot judgments on the basis 
of limited and often conflicting information,' Hatch, 
274 F.3d at 22, with limited resources to assist them. 
They must balance the parents' interest in the care, 
custody, and control of their children with the state's 
interest in protecting the children's welfare .... In the 
circumstances of this case, imposing the added 
burden of potential liability for damages under 
§ 1983 would interfere unnecessarily with the 
performance of a difficult and essential job." Gomes, 
451 F.3d at 44-45. 
The split is clear. In DeShaney, this Court 
explained the grant of certiorari both "[b]ecause of 
the inconsistent approaches taken by the lower 
courts," and "the importance of the issue to the 
administration of state and local governments." 
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 194. Respectfully, NASW 
suggests that the same applies in this case. 
C. Today, More Than 130,000 Social 
Workers And Fellow Child 
Protective Services Staff Await 
This Court's Guidance On The 
Issue. 
Following the Sixth Circuit decision, more than 
130,000 NASW members find themselves in a 
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confused legal landscape: should they decide to 
refrain from action and leave a child abused they are 
protected from personal liability by DeShaney; 
should they decide to take action, however, and 
remove the child from abuse their exposure to 
personal liability is circuit dependent. 
Thus, for example, should the removal take place 
in Cleveland, Ohio, the social workers will likely be 
personally liable for their actions. If, however, the 
same removal takes place in Denver, Colorado, no 
such personal liability will attach. 
This legal landscape provides negative incentives 
to take action (exposing not only the social workers 
to personal liability, but also the children to 
unnecessary and preventable risk). This legal 
landscape is also inconsistent, arbitrary, and unjust. 
It presents social workers with a dilemma of almost 
Salamonie proportions: should they refrain from 
action, exposing the child to risk of permanent harm 
or even death while remaining protected legally 
(DeShaney), or should they act, saving the child but 
exposing themselves to personal liability? Indeed, 
"[t]he decisions caseworkers make every day would 
challenge King Solomon, yet most of them lack 
Solomon's wisdom, few enjoy his credibility with the 
public, and none command his resources." Richard 
Behrman, Mary Larner & Carol Stevenson, 
Protecting Children from Abuse and Neglect: 
Analysis and Recommendations, 8 FUTURE OF 
CHILDREN NO.l, 4, (1998), available at http:// 
futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/do 
cs/08_ 0 l_Analysis. pdf. 
ii 
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For these reasons, this Court's guidance is timely 
and this case provides the appropriate vehicle for 
doing so. Thus Ohio, the state from which this case 
emerged is, unfortunately, one of leaders in child-
abuse statistics nationwide. While in terms of overall 
population Ohio is seventh in the nation, it ranked 
fifth in 2010 in terms of per-capita child abuse-
related deaths, with 83 deaths reported that year 
alone. See Child Abuse & Neglect Deaths, supra, at 
17. Some of these deaths could have been potentially 
prevented had the children been removed. In 
addition, 29,250 incidents of child abuse and neglect 
were reported in Ohio in 2012 alone, with each of the 
preceding four years registering over 30,000 abuse 
cases a year. See Child Maltreatment 2012, Id. at 30. 
In light of this data, the need for legal guidance is 
clear. 
CONCLUSION 
Allowing the Sixth Circuit decision to stand would 
substantially impair the ability of social workers to 
protect children from abuse - a major Congressional 
and States' legislative priority. This Court has 
protected social workers from personal liability 
before, under less favorable circumstances 
(DeShaney). Today, this Court is called to extend this 
protection of qualified immunity from inaction to 
reasonable action. Such a result would properly align 
the social workers' interests with that of Congress's 
and the States' - to protect children from abuse. To 
address these important issues, amici respectfully 
ask that the Court grant Certiorari in this matter. 
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